Showing posts with label oil. Show all posts
Showing posts with label oil. Show all posts

Friday, October 21, 2022

Why doesn't the Ecuador country risk go down?

By Luis Fierro Carrion (*)

Twitter: @Luis_Fierro_C

In recent weeks, the so-called "country risk" of Ecuador, instead of going down, has continued to rise, reaching 1,945 basis points (that is, 19.45% above the US Treasury bond rate). .

The "country risk" essentially reflects the probability that a country declares a default on servicing its foreign debt. It is true that Ecuador has a negative trajectory in this regard, having declared a moratorium on 11 occasions, tying with Venezuela and Argentina in the moratorium record (the last in 2020, at the beginning of the pandemic). (Spain has more defaults, but over 5 centuries).

However, Ecuador's macroeconomic indicators should rather have induced a reduction in said risk differential.

A few weeks ago, an agreement was announced to restructure the external debt with Chinese entities, reducing the interest rate between 0.2 and 1%; extending deadlines; and reducing debt service by $870 million in 2022-23.

The fiscal deficit has fallen from $7.1 billion in 2020 to $2.3 billion in 2022. The public debt/GDP ratio will drop from 62.2% of GDP in 2020 to 57% of GDP in 2023. International reserves have exceeded $8.4 billion (having fallen to less than $2 billion in March 2020). The average price of oil has exceeded IMF projections (by $24.20 per barrel in 2022, and by $13.50 per barrel in the medium term). The projected GDP growth rate in 2022 (2.9% according to the IMF) is one of the highest in the region, while inflation is one of the lowest (4.1%).

All these objective macroeconomic factors should have lowered the country risk to around 500-600 points, but instead it has shot up to almost 2,000 points.

The explanation, therefore, is not that the default risk has increased in the short term (I would say that this risk is zero, given that the main payments to the IMF and China have been postponed from 2025, and of sovereign bonds to 2026).

The concern is fundamentally political:

  • It is considered that the government of President Lasso will not be able to approve structural reforms in the Assembly, for example, in the labor or investment legislation.
  • The commitment to double oil production does not seem viable (mining production will continue to increase, but gradually).
  • There is a risk that the Assembly will dismiss the President, or that he will invoke the "simultaneous death" (closing the Assembly and calling for new elections).
  • Although the leader of the indigenous confederation, Leonidas Iza, has weakened his support within the indigenous movement, a new “national insurrection” is still possible, affecting oil, mining, and rural production (agriculture, livestock, flowers, etc.).
  • It is feared that the next government (either a product of the “crossed death”, or regular elections in 2025) will not be “market friendly” and will invoke a new debt moratorium.

The "Iza effect" then becomes in reality an Iza-Correa-PSC-Pachakutik effect. Some PSC spokespersons (among them Mayor Cynthia Viteri) have questioned the servicing of the external debt, and apparently they have a close alliance with Correísmo and the “anti-capitalist” sectors of the Pachakutik movement.

There are also technical factors that affect Ecuador's country risk, such as low liquidity and high transaction costs, given that the country is not a recurring issuer.

In the long term, the only way to overcome this perception of high risk is by achieving a fiscal agreement between the main political forces, assuming as an objective to lower the cost of the country's external financing; and tax reforms that raise the level of fiscal pressure in the country to levels close to the average for Latin America. Currently, it is 19.1% of GDP, while the average for Latin America is 21.9%, and for OECD countries 33.5%.


(*) Translated version of the column published in "El Universo" newspaper on October 20, 2022

https://www.eluniverso.com/opinion/columnistas/por-que-no-baja-el-riesgo-pais-nota/




Friday, April 15, 2022

War and Economy

By Luis Fierro Carrion (*)

Twitter: https://twitter.com/Luis_Fierro_C

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacted a heavy human toll, with tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians killed, apart from some 20,000 Russian troops (as of April 13, according to Ukrainian sources). In the besieged city of Mariupol alone, the Mayor indicated that more than 20,000 civilians could have been killed. The number of injured could reach more than 100,000, and there are more than 11 million displaced people (of which about 5 million have left Ukraine).

Apart from this, the war has brought considerable economic losses, with the destruction of homes, infrastructure, roads, etc. It is estimated that more than USD 100 billion worth of infrastructure has been destroyed in Ukraine. The World Bank estimates that Ukraine's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) could fall by 45% as a result of the war, due to the collapse of production and exports in much of its territory. The poverty rate could rise from 1.8% of the population to about a third.

The Russian economy, subject to severe sanctions by NATO countries and other allies (Japan, South Korea, Australia, etc.), could fall by 11.2% in 2022, according to the World Bank.

If the war is prolonged and escalated, the drop in GDP could reach 75% in the case of Ukraine and 20% in the case of Russia.

Other countries severely affected will be the neighbors of Ukraine and Russia, including Belarus (-6 %) and Moldova (countries in which Russian troops also operate, in the former at the invitation of its dictator, in the latter due to the occupation of the Transnistria area). 

The growth projection for Central Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania) will be reduced from 4.7% to 3.5%, due to the influx of refugees, the increase in commodity prices and the deterioration of business confidence. Refugee influx fluctuates between 4% of the pre-war population (Hungary) to 15% in the case of Moldova; Almost two and a half million people have entered Poland, equivalent to 6% of the pre-war population.

At the global level, it is estimated that the GDP growth rate will fall from 4% to 3%, mainly as a result of the effects on world trade, and the rise in the prices of fuel and food.

Price increases have been especially pronounced for commodities in which Russia and Ukraine are key exporters, including: natural gas, coal, oil, fertilizers, wheat, aluminum, iron ore and palladium.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimates that the growth rate will fall by one point in 2022, from 2.1% to 1.2%, and there could be a contraction of 0.4 % in 2023.

The growth scenarios for each country depend on various factors, from their commercial links with Russia and Ukraine, to their level of indebtedness; but in general, the IDB expects it to decrease compared to the pre-war scenario.

The high price of hydrocarbons and cereals will benefit the countries that export these products, while the importers, particularly those in Central America and the Caribbean, will suffer higher inflation.

Russia and Ukraine are important markets for several of the products that Latin America and the Caribbean exports, such as dairy products and meat (Southern Cone), fruits (for example, bananas, in the case of Ecuador) and flowers.

Around 20% of the region's total fertilizer imports come from Russia, as do more than 5% of iron and steel imports.

Another collateral effect will be the rise in international interest rates, as a result of the higher inflation faced by countries such as the United States and Europe.

In the case of Ecuador, the impacts will be contradictory: a positive effect due to the rise in the price of oil, a negative effect due to the increase in the price of fertilizers and the closure of the markets for bananas and flowers. The World Bank increased its 2022 growth forecast to 4.3%  (the second fastest growing country in Latin America, after Colombia).

But uncertainty will be the global and regional tone, subject to how the Russian invasion and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic evolve.


(*) Translation of my column published in Diario "El Universo" on April 15, 2022'

https://www.eluniverso.com/opinion/columnistas/la-guerra-y-la-economia-nota/



Russia's flagship warship the Moskva has sunk




Saturday, May 23, 2020

The lost savings Funds would have cushioned the crisis in Ecuador


By Luis Fierro Carrión (*)

On May 11, Norway's sovereign wealth fund decided to liquidate 3% of the fund's value, to support the government's efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and boost economic recovery.

That withdrawal of 3% of the value was equivalent to 37 billion dollars. This is so because the fund has accumulated a value of 1.18 trillion dollars. It is the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world; it is followed by SWFs from China (China Investment Corporation), Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, all with more than $ 500 billion in assets at the end of 2019.

In Latin America, some countries have stabilization and savings funds, but with much smaller amounts. For example, Chile has an economic and social stabilization fund ($ 14.7 billion) and a Pension Reserve Fund ($ 9.4 billion). Other countries with smaller funds include Peru, Brazil, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, and Bolivia (all linked to the export of natural resources). Venezuela had a substantive fund, but with its protracted crisis it has vanished.

In the case of Norway, the fund has the official name of “Global Government Pension Fund”, and was created in 1990 to save the oil income that the Nordic country was receiving; The objective was to reduce the volatility of tax revenues due to the fluctuation of oil prices in the international market. A secondary objective was to reduce the macroeconomic impact of oil revenues, which in other countries (including Ecuador) has generated the so-called “Dutch disease”, in which the productivity of other economic sectors was affected.

The "Tiny Funds" in Ecuador

In Ecuador, apart from the international reserves, there were some attempts to create a stabilization or savings fund:

• In 1998, the Petroleum Stabilization Fund (FEP) was created to accumulate the surpluses of oil revenues above the budget.
• In 2002, the “Fund for Stabilization, Social and Productive Investment, and Reduction of Public Debt” (FEIREP), a trust managed by the Central Bank, was created.
• Later, in 2005, at the initiative of then Minister Correa, the FEIREP was transformed into the “Account of Productive and Social Reactivation” (CEREPS); 20% of its income went into a “Savings and Contingency Fund” (FAC), apart from the unused CEREPS balances at the end of the fiscal year. The FAC had among its specific objectives to be able to attend natural disasters and other emergencies.
• In 2006, the “Ecuadorian Investment Fund in the Energy and Hydrocarbon Sectors” (FEISEH) was created, fed with the income of Block 15 (after the declaration of expiration of the Occidental oil contract), as well as the Eden-Yuturi fields and Limoncocha.

Between these “tiny funds”, as then President Rafael Correa derogatively called them, savings equivalent to 12.1% of GDP were accumulated (https://flacsoandes.edu.ec/web/imagesFTP/9431.WP_018_CGiraldo_01.pdf ). Apart from this, the balance of public debt was reduced.

During the Constituent Assembly, an Organic Law was approved in 2008 for the “Recovery of the Use of State Petroleum Resources and Administrative Rationalization of Debt Processes”. In practice, it meant the elimination of these funds and facilitating the contracting of additional debt.

Oil revenues and fuel subsidies

During the decade of Correa's government, the country had oil revenues for a total of $95,581 million (35% of all oil revenues in the history of the country, in real terms, according to a study by Alberto Acosta and John Cajas, “A Wasted Decade”). Between 2007 and 2016, the non-financial public sector had total revenues of $ 283 billion. 

Notwithstanding this massive level of income, not only were the savings and contingency funds eliminated, but the net international reserve was left in negative terms; and Correa bequeathed a total public debt of about $ 60 billion.

Of the total oil revenue, about $ 23 billion (a quarter) was used for fossil fuel subsidies. This subsidy is very regressive, as more than 50 % benefits the two quintiles with the highest incomes: apart from which a significant part of the subsidy escapes by contraband. The subsidy also encouraged fossil fuel consumption, with adverse effects on climate change, health, pollution, etc.

After a failed attempt in October 2019 to eliminate subsidies for extra gasoline and diesel (the subsidy for super gasoline had previously been eliminated), on May 19 the President issued Decree 1054, which establishes a new market price system for extra gasoline, extra gasoline with ethanol and diesel. A “price band” system was established, taking into account the cost of fuels, the marketing margin, plus a monthly variation limit of +/- 5%.

In the initial period of application of this new price system, the result was that the price decreased, given the significant drop in the international price of crude oil and derivatives in international markets. Thus, the retail price of extra gasoline (including the commercial margin) decreased to $ 1.75 per gallon, and the price of diesel decreased slightly to $ 1 per gallon.

The Ministry of Economy and Finance will design the “necessary compensation instruments as a consequence of the application of the price band system”. Minister Martínez indicated that the government is analyzing social protection mechanisms in the event of sustained growth in the prices of gasoline and diesel. There is a preliminary proposal to increase the Human Development Bonus cash transfer program by $ 10 and compensate the most vulnerable in the event of an increase in public transport tickets. Another alternative is to subsidize public transport (either to users or carriers). 

Laws approved by the Assembly

In the laws approved by the Assembly, the Solidarity Law or COVID-19 and the Law on Public Finances, there are two aspects to highlight regarding the issue of oil revenues.

On the one hand, the possibility of contracting insurance to hedge the risk of lower oil prices is introduced, as the Mexican government has regularly done (Minister Martínez argued that previously he did not have the legal backing to do so, which will now be made possible by a provision of the Public Finance Regulation Law).

On the other hand, a Fiscal Stabilization Fund is created again, from income from the exploitation and commercialization of non-renewable natural resources (oil, gas, mining) that exceed what is contemplated in the annual public budget.

Obviously, with current prices, it will not be possible in the short term to accumulate resources in the fund, nor to contract a price insurance, but the reform is designed for the future, so that, if another pandemic, natural disaster or abrupt fall in the prices of exports occurs, Ecuador has a financial “cushion” – a cushion that the Correa government took away from us.


(*) This is an English translation of the article published by “Revista Gestión” on May 23, 2020.

The author is an economist from the Catholic University of Ecuador (PUCE), with graduate degrees from the University of Oregon and the University of Texas at Austin. He was a staff member of the IDB from 1997 to 2013, and Representative of Ecuador to the IMF in 2006. Advisor on climate finance and development issues. Personal opinions.

Tuesday, February 6, 2018

Defensive investments to confront stock market correction

As I had anticipated on several occasions, including in this October 2017 article, the stock market is due for a major correction (I'm talking about a 40-50 % correction, not just 10 %).

http://economicsandinvestment.blogspot.de/2017/10/us-stock-market-overdue-drastic.html

This correction will affect all major markets, and all sorts of assets and commodities.

In particular, it will also lead to:
  • a deflation of the real estate bubble (in the U.S. and other countries).
  • a fall of commodity prices (in particular, gold and oil).
  • interest rates and bond yields will start to rise
  • cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, of course will collapse completely (their's was not only a bubble, but one of the worst manias in history). 
I had anticipated these movements both on this blog and on Twitter:




So if all assets and all major markets will suffer corrections and fall simultaneously, how can investors defend themselves?

I would say four things; which, in general, I have always said, since the founding of this blog in 2009:

  1. Diversify!
  2. Buy low, sell high!
  3. Lower debt, increase savings!
  4. Invest for the LONG TERM!
In this environment, this means to not sell in a panic (buy low, not sell low, remember?).

And also to broaden your diversification strategies.

Here are some investments you might consider (to put small percentages in each, not all your eggs in one basket - diversify, remember?).
  • Gold and other commodity ETFs (yes, I just said they will probably fall in the near to medium term, but they tend to hold up in the long term, especially in environments of higher inflation).
  • Bonds (particularly inflation-protected securities like TIPS; also high-yield bonds).
  • Consumer staples companies. 
  • "Giffen goods" or services, that is stocks in companies that do better when the economy is not doing so great (say, Walmart or fast-food restaurants).
  • Real estate, particularly through REIT Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs).
  • Broad Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in general are a good idea, as they enable diversification.
  • International equity ETFs, especially in countries/areas that are still expected to grow (Asia, Latin America, Africa).
  • High-dividend stock ETFs.  Even though their price might fall, they will still pay high dividends.
  • Invest in new and growing technologies.  Say, for example, renewable energy and electric vehicles, instead of coal or oil.
  • Always keep any funds you will need in the next 2-3 months in cash (and maintain a percentage of your assets in a money market or CD account; especially in times of a bear market, such as now). 
And whatever you do, DO NOT speculate with Bitcoin or any crypto-currencies.  These are worthless, you will lose your shirt.

April 8 postscript:  since January 26, the S&P 500 Index has fallen by nearly 10 %.  As I mention above, I expect it to continue falling, probably at least an additional 10-20 %.

In addition to the fact that the US stock market continues to be very overvalued by historical standards (current CAPE or Shiller PE Ratio is 31, vs a historical average of 16, http://www.multpl.com/shiller-pe/), the Trump Administration is exacerbating these trends by:
  • threatening to launch a trade war with China and others, that would lead to a global recession.
  • attacking private US companies (Amazon, Nordstrom, media companies).
  • having the least experienced economic policy team in the last half century: the chief economic adviser, Larry Kudlow, does not have a degree in Economics, and was selected mainly for his role as a TV pundit; his trade adviser, Peter Navarro, is ridiculed by the vast majority of economists for his farfetched and dangerous views on protectionism and China; and Steven Mnuchin, whose main experience was to bail out a housing lender and implement harsh foreclosure practices.
An additional factor you might consider is that we are due for a recession based on the 11-year economic cycle theory of Jevons, which has shown surprising consistency in the post-war period:

https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40271/






Wednesday, February 18, 2015

How are oil exporting countries facing the falling price of oil?

By Luis Fierro Carrión (*)

(A Spanish version of this article was written for the February 2015 edition of Revista Gestión, Ecuador).

The international price of crude oil has dropped by 50% between June 2014 and February 2015 (the benchmark West Texas Intermediate - WTI - has dropped from $ 105 US dollars per barrel to $ 50, while the Brent fell from $ 115 per barrel in June to $ 61 in February).


While it is difficult to predict the future evolution of economic variables, it is not impossible - in September 2013 I had already predicted a fall in the oil prices, in an article published in Revista Gestión No. 231 (http://goo.gl/qZJin8) and in my blog (http://goo.gl/BsKHab).

Several structural factors in the oil market lead us to believe that the price will remain at around current levels, and take time to recover:

• Supply has increased, particularly with the expansion of oil production in North America, which has led the US to replace Saudi Arabia as the world's largest oil producer; and that Canada has entered the list of the 10 largest oil exporters. It is estimated that there is an oversupply of 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd).

(See chart on changes of oil production on p. 160 of goo.gl/JY5lnG).

• Reduced demand due to the promotion of renewable energies and energy efficiency, the persistent recession in the European Union and Japan, and slowing economic growth in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - particularly Russia, which has entered into an economic crisis, and Brazil, which will also see an economic contraction).

• In 2014, there was a total of $ 310 billion invested in clean energy, the issue of "green bonds" tripled to $ 38 billion, and the capacity of renewable energy generation reached 1,560 GW (http://goo.gl/5xQpQt, http://goo.gl/b1FBfs).

• An additional factor was the appreciation of the US dollar against other currencies (by 10% over 2014), which implies cheaper dollar-denominated commodity prices.

In addition, Saudi Arabia and other oil exporters in the Middle East changed their strategy, from the defense of high prices to the defense of market share, to the extent that Prince Alwaleed bin Talal of Saudi Arabia stated that the price of oil will never again reach $ 100 per barrel, due to changes in supply and demand.  There were also reports that Saudi Arabia was using the oil market to pressure Russia to abandon its Syrian ally, Bashar al-Asaad (http://goo.gl/4nbQQV).

Some OPEC members may also be seeking to pressure some high-cost producers such as those drilling using hydraulic fracturing ("fracking"), the tar sands of Canada and Venezuela, and those who drill on offshore platforms in inhospitable areas (such as the Arctic Ocean). There has already been a decline in investment in new wells, with the suspension of investments for several tens of billions of dollars (http://goo.gl/Yi9rDb). The bet of some Middle Eastern producers is that, after several years of reduced exploration in new wells, global supply will fall, they will regain market share, and prices will rise again.


Goldman Sachs predicted that WTI will remain at $ 39 per barrel over the next six months, and will reach $ 65 within 12 months (previously, it forecasted $ 75 and $ 80 at 6 and 12 months) (http://goo.gl/vXhvXa).

Macro-economic impact

The oil exporting countries exported a total of about 43 million barrels per day (of which about 30 million were from OPEC). Of this total, 75% corresponds to the 10 largest exporters. Export revenues amounted to US $ 1.56 trillion, at an average price of $ 100 per barrel and $ 784 billion at an average price of $ 50 per barrel - that is, those countries have lost approximately half of their oil revenues (in practice, even more than half, as part of the production is performed by private companies, that participate in the rent - or, in the case of Ecuador, have a guaranteed price for their provision of services).

Among the top 10 exporters, oil revenues represent an average of 24.5% of GDP; the impact on GDP growth rate is estimated between -3.8% in Saudi Arabia and +0.2% of GDP in Canada (in Canada the ratio of oil in total GDP is minimum, 3.2%).

In the case of Ecuador, oil’s share of GDP in 2012 was 19.1%, and Maria de la Paz Vela estimated in issue No. 247 of Revista Gestión, in a low scenario, with an average oil price of $ 61.5 per barrel, GDP growth would be between 1.8 and 2.3%, i.e. about 2% below the initial projection of the government. The average impact on GDP for OPEC countries for which there are estimates is -1.9%.

Oil exports also represent a significant percentage of total exports, which fluctuated in 2013 – according to OPEC – between more than 99% of exports for the cases of Angola, Libya and Iraq, 96% in Venezuela and 33.2 % in the case of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Ecuador was in an intermediate point between OPEC countries, with 54.9%. According to the Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE), this percentage dropped to 51.3% in the third quarter of 2014 (reflecting the initial drop in prices).

But what is more serious is the impact on tax revenues. The dependence on oil revenues in some OPEC countries in 2013 amounted to over 90% of total tax revenues (Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Libya). Venezuela was in between, with 46.6%, while in Ecuador it was about 30%.

Another way of looking at fiscal dependence is the price of oil that is required to balance the fiscal accounts. Here the range is between $180 US dollars per barrel for Libya, to $ 137 for Iran, about $ 120 for Ecuador and Venezuela, and $ 68 for the UAE.

The difference between the level of dependence on oil for revenue and the price per barrel that is required to balance the budget is because some countries were already dragging a large fiscal deficit and foreign debt. In Venezuela, for example, the fiscal deficit had already exceeded 14% of GDP in 2014 - before the collapse of the international price of oil - while in countries like Iraq, Ecuador and Algeria, the fiscal deficit already exceeded 4% of GDP.
            
In part, the fiscal deficit in some oil exporting countries is due to the high subsidies offered to energy consumption. According to IMF estimates for 2011 (http://goo.gl/n45CYl), Iran offered energy subsidies (oil, gas, electricity and coal) amounting to 50.94% of total tax revenue. Second among oil exporters stood Venezuela, with 20.38%; then Saudi Arabia with 18.66%, UAE with 16.25%, and Ecuador fifth with 15.88% of tax revenue. Since then, Iran and other countries (Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, among others) have significantly reduced their energy subsidies. Some analysts and institutions have suggested that now is the best time to reduce subsidies, since prices have dropped, so the impact of the elimination of subsidies will be reduced.

Economic policies to address the fall in oil prices

With respect to the response that major oil exporters have adopted to the fall in international prices, we can divide the exporting countries into three groups:

a) Countries with high international reserves and sovereign wealth funds

Many countries exporting oil and other commodities took advantage of the windfall gains of the last decade (with high prices) to accumulate international reserves, sovereign wealth funds (SWF), pre-pay their debts, and accumulate other net assets. That is to say, they followed anti-cyclical policies, and saved during the time of "fat cows".

For example, Saudi Arabia currently has reserves of $ 740 billion, equivalent to 60 months of imports (five years); additionally, it has two SWFs with a current value of $ 762 billion. In other words, it can overcome a prolonged period of low prices without any difficulty (and, additionally, has proven reserves of 265 billion barrels, which means it could continue producing at current levels for 28 years, without any additional exploration).

In the case of the UAE, while reserves only cover imports for 2.8 months, it has the second largest amount invested in sovereign wealth funds (after China), with a total of $ 1,078 billion. Adding the reserves and the funds, it has enough to cover 54 months of imports.

Norway and Canada, which are the ninth and tenth largest oil exporters, have the third and seventh largest amount invested in sovereign funds, $ 893 and $ 416 billion respectively.

b) Countries with average levels of reserves and sovereign wealth funds

Another group of oil-exporting countries whose reserves allow them to import between 8 and 20 months of goods are: Angola, Iraq, Russia, Iran, and Nigeria. All these have sovereign wealth funds, with amounts ranging from $ 1.4 billion for Nigeria to $ 181.8 billion in the case of Russia.

In each of these cases, there are, however, other complicating factors:

• Russia and Iran are subject to international sanctions (for the invasion of parts of Ukraine in the case of Russia, for the enrichment of nuclear material in Iran's case). In both cases, they also face significant fiscal deficits and foreign debt.

• In the case of Russia, the ruble has lost half of its value in the past year; the stock market has fallen 48.5% since last year; a fiscal deficit of 3% of GDP is forecast; and a GDP contraction of 4-5% in 2015. The rating agency Moody's downgraded the Russian debt to Baa3, or “junk” category. It is uncertain what the effect of the severe economic crisis might be on Russia’s foreign policy, particularly regarding the intervention in several former Soviet countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, etc.).

• As for Iran, its currency (the rial) has lost two thirds of its value against the dollar in recent years; it has already reduced subsidies to energy and basic goods; and 20% spending cuts were announced. Iran is likely to consider the desirability of reaching an agreement regarding the development of nuclear materials to remove sanctions (which have led to reducing oil exports in half).

• Iraq faces internal conflict, which has recently evolved into the occupation of part of its territory by the Islamic State, and the growing autonomy of the Kurdish region. Given the severe impact of the falling price of oil on their tax coffers, it will probably have to reduce energy subsidies, and make other spending cuts, while at the same time trying to consolidate the power of the central state.

• Nigeria also faces ethnic conflicts, particularly by the Islamist group Boko Haram. It also suffers from problems of governance and corruption. The rebel groups steal some of the oil production; and in late 2013 the Governor of the Central Bank reported that the State oil company had failed to deposit $ 50 billion in oil revenues.

• Angola is nominally a country ruled by a Marxist party that led the process of independence with support from Cuba. However, the daughter of President José dos Santos (in power for 35 years), Isabel, is the richest woman in Africa, with a fortune estimated at $ 3 billion; his son, José Filomeno, was named Manager of the (public) sovereign wealth fund of Angola, and also founded a private bank in Switzerland. Angola will likely cut government spending.

c) Countries with meager reserves, high fiscal deficits

Finally, we have the cases of Ecuador and Venezuela, which have reduced amounts of international reserves; a sovereign fund with very meager investments in Venezuela ($ 800 million) and none in Ecuador; which were already facing high fiscal deficits for several years (despite high oil prices); and which have also been increasing their indebtedness rapidly in recent years.

According to a study by the Institute of International Finance, "Weaker public finances will dim the growth outlook for net oil exporting countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela and some in MENA (Middle East and North Africa), where rising oil revenues boosted fiscal spending in recent years… Countries with an already high current account deficit, such as Colombia and Ecuador, could come under additional pressure. Venezuela and Ecuador in particular have a low reserve coverage ratio and fragile capital market access, posing financing risks” (http://goo.gl/ipGyGU)The two countries also have high levels of energy subsidies.

The Presidents of the two countries traveled to China in January to try to get new credit.

In the case of Ecuador, the official news agency ANDES announced a line of credit from Eximbank of China, to finance the export of goods and services from China, amounting to $ 5,296 million; $ 250 million of the same entity for the import of induction stoves; $ 1,500 million from the China Development Bank (CDB) to partially finance the investment plan of Ecuador; and $ 480 million from the Bank of China to finance Millennium Schools and other infrastructure projects. The Finance Minister subsequently reported that, of this total, about $ 4 billion would enter in 2015. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) would provide $ 800 million. These new loans will help to close the funding gap in the budget, estimated at $ 10 billion after the fall of oil prices.

With these loans, total debt to China (including the balance of oil pre-sale credits) exceed $ 10 billion; and constitute almost half of the public external debt, that with these new resources would amount to $ 21,713 million. Total public debt, including domestic, would represent more than 30% of GDP, still below the legal limit of 40%.

Unlike other producers of oil, Ecuador is dollarized and therefore cannot devalue or promote a depreciation of the exchange rate (in fact, as was noted above, the dollar has appreciated against other currencies). This has led the government to impose trade safeguards against imports; restrict the import quota of vehicles (assembled and CKD); and adopt other import restrictions. Some fiscal measures were also adopted to try to raise the non-oil tax revenues (surtax to telecommunications companies that dominate the market, limits to the distribution of private company profits to their employees; 100% tax to stoves, water heaters and other appliances that use gas; among others).

The government cut by 3.9%, $ 1,420 million, the 2015 budget (in part, by suspending the salary increase to public employees of 5% that had initially been considered).
            
Venezuela presents a more complicated picture, given the high dependence of the economy on oil: 96% of exports, 26.7% of GDP and 46.6% of tax revenues. The public external debt reached $ 118 billion in 2013. In recent weeks, the "country risk" has risen to 3,100 points, insurance in case of moratorium (CDS) has soared, to reflect a moratorium probability of 81% in a year; and the risk rating has fallen to near-moratorium levels (Moody's downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1, just one step above moratorium).

The fiscal deficit, which had already reached 14% of GDP, could increase despite the announcement of a 20% cut in spending. The bolivar is currently handled in various exchange rates, and there is growing scarcity of commodities. The official inflation rate has exceeded 63%, the highest in the world.


Other Policy Recommendations

In its study on "Global Economic Prospects" published in mid-January 2015 (http://goo.gl/JY5lnG), the World Bank made some policy recommendations against falling oil prices:

• Reduce or eliminate subsidies to fossil fuels.

• Instead, consider introducing fuel taxes (to continue promoting the reduction of energy intensity of GDP, despite the lower oil price).

• "For oil-exporters, the sharp decline in oil prices is also a reminder of the vulnerabilities inherent in a highly concentrated reliance on oil exports and an opportunity to reinvigorate their efforts to diversify. These efforts should focus on proactive measures to move incentives away from activities in the non-tradable sector and employment in the public sector, including encouraging high-value added activities, exports in non-resource intensive sectors, and development of skills that are important for private sector employment" (p. 168).

The collapse in oil prices could help oil producers and exporters to move away from high-emission sectors and industries towards renewable energy and other low-emission technologies.

In the article published in Revista Gestión No. 231 (September 2013), which had anticipated a future decline in oil prices, I added the following: "What can Ecuador do to adapt to this scenario? In general, it should invest windfall revenues currently generated by oil, either through a sovereign wealth fund (á la Norway or Kuwait) or directly in the generation of hydropower and other renewable energy, and development of other sources of revenue." I also recommended "to reduce the subsidy to domestic consumption of hydrocarbons."

In No. 242 (August 2014), Maria Gabriela Vivero and I suggested that "moments of expansion and large inflows of resources such as this should be used to repay debt and build reserves. Therefore, the aggressiveness with which the Government is acquiring new debt obligations is surprising".

(*) Climate Finance Advisor. Economist, Catholic University of Ecuador; M.A. in Economics, the University of Oregon, M. Sc. Econ. and Ph.D. (c), the University of Texas at Austin. The views expressed are personal and do not reflect those of any institution.

Monday, November 18, 2013

The slowdown of the Chinese economy

A version of this article was published in Spanish in "Revista Gestión" (http://www.revistagestion.ec/).

The slowdown of the Chinese economy

By Luis Fierro Carrión

In recent months, alarm bells have been going off about the likely slowdown of the Chinese economy, which could have negative effects for the world economy, and in particular for commodity exporters such as Ecuador and other Latin American countries.

During 33 years (1979-2012), the average annual growth rate of China was close to 10 %, and it became the second largest economy in the world.  The GDP per capita increased from $250 in 1980 (measured in purchasing power parity) to $9,185 in 2012 - that is, it had a 36-fold increase!

This extraordinary growth reflected diverse trends:  the reincorporation of China into the world market; the capitalist development (within a Communist political regime); urbanization; industrialization; opening towards foreign direct investment and joint ventures, etc.  There were some particular characteristics of the hybrid Chinese model, such as the expansion of state-owned enterprises (SOE), financed by the equally state-owned development banks.

But in part this accelerated growth simply reflected starting off at such a low base, after many decades of economic stagnation, "cultural revolution", state ownership of the means of production, and military conflicts.

The official growth rate target for 2013 is 7.5 %, but it is likely that this figure will not be met.  The longer term prospects for the future are even less auspicious, as economists believe that China is entering into what is know as the "middle income growth trap".

The rapid urbanization process seems to have reached excessive levels, with high urban rates of pollution:  16 of the 20 most contaminated cities of the world are located in China, and the life expectancy in Northeastern China has started to decrease as a consequence of respiratory and other illnesses associated with pollution.

Workers are starting to demand higher salaries and better working conditions, which will make a model based on cheap labor untenable.  Investment - that is as high as 50 % of GDP - is facing decreasing returns, as the labor surplus is falling.  The Chinese stock market index (SSEA) has fallen by 8 % since December 2012.  The state-owned financial system is facing increasing disequilibrium   And the population is ageing, and growing at a slower rate (with the added problem of having more males than females).

The slowdown in China has already had a negative effect on the prices of commodities.  The price of metal products, for example, has fallen by 6.5 % thus far in 2013, and the price of gold by 26.2 %.  This has affected commodity producing countries, such as Australia, Brazil, Peru and Chile; and it could also affect oil exporters, if the same trend starts to be felt in the oil market (the price of the West Texas Intermediate benchmark has fallen by 7.9 % in the month to November 12, although it is still up for the year).

What can countries such as Ecuador do to confront the Chinese slowdown?  Diversify its productive matrix and its commercial partners; depend less on commodities, and more on the increase of productivity of manufacture and services; depend less, as well, on Chinese financing, which will probably become less available and more expensive as China experiences growing economic and financial difficulties.